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Abstract
This paper presents a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which each 
household can make a costly investment in patience capital at each time. We show 
that the interior long-run steady state is unstable, in the sense that per household, 
there is a one-dimensional curve lying in the two-dimensional space of its patience 
capital and physical capital amounts, and convergence happens only when its ini-
tial pair falls exactly on the curve. Households with the initial vectors falling in the 
upper side of the curve invest more in patience capital, which leads themselves to 
save more, and hence, the consumption level grows in the long run. Households 
with the initial vectors falling in the lower side opt out from investing in patience 
capital, leading to a decay of patience level, which leads themselves to save less and 
hence they perish in the long run. We also show a possibility that there is an expand-
ing swing between the two classes.
Keywords Time preference · Patience capital · Long-run distribution
1 Introduction
1.1  The Ramsey conjecture and endogenous time preference
The standard consumption-saving model in which households maximize their dis-
counted lifetime utilities, when put under the natural assumption that they differ in 
their time preferences, has an uneasy long-run implication—given a time-constant 
interest rate, households are generically divided into two “classes”, one such that 
their consumptions and wealths converge to zero or subsistence level, the other 
such that their consumptions and wealths diverge to infinity; moreover, in the full 
dynamic general equilibrium environment in which the interest rate lowers over 
time according to diminishing returns to capital, all but the most patient household 
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economically “perish”, and only the most patient one can “survive”, actually regard-
less of earnings and initial distribution of capitals. Such “division of society into two 
classes” has been conjectured by Ramsey in his classic work Ramsey (1928), and 
later confirmed by Becker (1980) and Bewley (1982) in the discrete-time setting and 
Mitra and Sorger (2013) in the continuous-time setting.
Look at the discounted utility form, written in the continuous-time setting which 
the current paper adopts:
where 훽 denotes the discount rate. When the long-run pure interest rate r is given as 
fixed, we have to have either:
or
generically. In the first case, the household saves less, or even borrows, and as this 
accumulates exponentially over time its consumption/wealth go to zero. In the sec-
ond case, the household saves more, and as this accumulates exponentially over time 
its consumption/wealth go to infinity.
When the long-run interest rate is flexibly adjusted to diminishing return to capi-
tal over time, it is expected to satisfy the condition:
but this can never be met when households have different 훽 s. Thus, it has been 
shown that all but one with the smallest 훽 are pushed away toward zero consump-
tion/wealth or subsistence level in the long run.1
There are two kinds of uneasiness here. One is that such long-run state does not 
look normatively right. There is nothing wrong in terms of the classical concept 
of welfare applied to “long-lived” households’ preferences over their consumption 
paths, since such equilibrium path is Pareto-efficient and even “fair” in the sense 
of envy-freeness if they have equal earnings and initial capital holding. According 
to this, it is simply that impatient households consume more in earlier periods. It 
is still problematic in two senses, though. First, since allocations take place over 
time, welfare criteria applied just to ex-ante evaluation of planned life-courses may 
be normatively insufficient, and it is ethically a different question whether we should 
accept resulting ex-post inequalities. Second, when the “long-lived” households are 
interpreted as families, such that nobody is responsible for in which family and in 
which generation and with what nature of time preference he or she is born, this 
extreme long-run inequality is definitely problematic.
∫
∞
0
v(c(t))e−훽tdt,
𝛽 > r
𝛽 < r,
훽 = r,
1 Because of this, homogeneity in time preference is vital for any macroeconomics based on the idea of 
representative agent, even when it allows heterogeneity in other dimensions like in Caselli and Ventura 
(2000).
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Second is that such extreme long-run inequality looks simply unrealistic. 
Although the precise answer depends on how long the “long-run” is, our crude sense 
tells us that plural and different households are there, while there exist unignorable 
and perhaps severe inequalities among them due to other reasons. This motivates 
various positive models to describe and explain that plural and different households 
can economically survive.
Because the extreme long-run inequality result depends critically on the assump-
tion of discounted utility preference, which is additively separable and stationary 
and seen as a knife-edge case even within the class of “rational (in the sense of 
dynamic consistency)” preferences, many preference models have been proposed to 
allow for the roles of non-separability and/or non-stationarity, and it has been inves-
tigated whether the extreme long-run inequality result is mildered or still persists.
To illustrate, consider that the discount rate at each moment takes the form 훽(x) , 
where x can be either a decision variable which can be chosen at each moment, 
such as consumption, or a state variable such as physical capital, or accumulated 
habit. The idea is that in the long run, the steady-state value of x for each household, 
denoted x∗ , can be flexibly adjusted, so that the interior steady-state condition:
is met, and this can hold for different 훽(⋅) as the steady-state value is flexibly 
adjusted. This allows us to shift our question from existence of interior steady state, 
which generically fails, to its stability.
There are various existing models of such endogenous time preference. Uzawa 
(1968) proposes a preference model in which 훽 depends on the current consumption, 
and it is axiomatized by Epstein (1983) in the discrete-time setting. Its further gen-
eralization is provided by Epstein (1987b), which allows non-linear way of discount-
ing continuation lifetime utility, and is seen as a continuous-time counterpart of the 
classic discrete-time model of recursive utility by Koopmans (1960). Based on those 
models of recursive utility, a number of studies provide characterizations of the sta-
bility condition for economies with heterogenous households, such as Epstein and 
Hynes (1983), Lucas and Stokey (1984), Epstein (1987a, b), Benhabib et al. (1988).2
These stability results assume that discount rate at each moment is increasing in 
present consumption. On the other hand, Das (2003, 2007), Hirose and Ikeda (2008) 
consider that discount rate is decreasing in present consumption. This is consistent 
with the empirically natural observation that the rich (poor) are more (im)patient, 
which was originally suggested by Fisher (1930). They show that steady state may 
be unstable, or that there are multiple steady states.
Note that the above-noted class is stationary, while weakening additive separa-
bility, and there preference over-consumption streams being held at each time is 
independent of histories of past consumptions, meaning that whatever the history is 
the consumer’s discounting between the present period and the next period depends 
훽(x∗) = r
2 Another possible explanation for survival of plural agents in steady state is to allow randomness of dis-
count factors. See Becker and Zilcha (1997) for example.
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only on the present consumption. This is somewhat odd as an explanation of the 
“Fisherian” story, because it says that regardless of wealth accumulation, a sudden 
change in the present consumption immediately changes the degree of patience, and 
also that such effect lasts only for one period. We view that patience should be mod-
eled rather as certain kind of capital.
Shi and Epstein (1993) incorporate habit formation into time-preference deter-
mination, in which 훽 depends on the level of consumption habit and is increasing in 
it, meaning that higher habit leads to more impatience. There, the habit rises as the 
household consumes more than the current habit level. This works as a stabilizer, as 
an over-consumption leads to higher habit, leading to less patience, leading to more 
current consumption but less in the future, leading to lower habit and more patience, 
and so on.
In the context of growth problem, Schumacher (2009) and Strulik (2012) con-
sider that discount rate at each moment depends on physical capital amount, which 
goes along the line that rich are more patient, and in general work in the direction to 
destabilize. They show that there are multiple steady states, so that the lower one is 
interpreted as a poverty trap.
1.2  Investment in time preference
This paper studies a model of endogenous time-preference formation, following 
Becker and Mulligan (1997), in which households can pay for costly investment to 
establish and maintain patience, where the degree of patience is now understood 
to be a capital. Following Doepke and Zilibotti (2005, 2008), we call such capital 
patience capital. A prominent example of the form of investment in patience capital 
is education, within or outside family.3
We view that investment in patience capital is a natural channel of endogene-
ity in time-preference determination, and it tells causal effect more directly than the 
above-noted elements. It captures better the reverse causality that the rich (poor) are 
more (im)patient, because they are rich (poor), not just the single direction that the 
rich (poor) are more (im)patient, because they are (im)patient.
Effect of education on time-preference determination is documented by experi-
mental studies such as Alan and Ertac (2018) and Perez-Arce (2017). Also, numbers 
of studies document that time preference is related to socioeconomic status which 
naturally require inputting wealth for acquisition and maintenance, or to wealth 
itself (see, for example, Lawrance 1991; Barsky 1997; Tanaka et al. 2010; Dohmen 
2015). Although the precise causal effects are yet unclear, it will be fair to say that 
acquiring and maintaining patience are at least costly.
Patience capital may be accumulated over time, while it can depreciate, as well. 
In the intergenerational interpretation, this means that patience capital is inherited to 
descendants. Although acquired characteristics are not inherited biologically, in the 
3 An alternative interpretation of patience capital is that it is a kind of health capital and the resulting 
endogenous discount rate is associated with survival probability, where investment in it takes the form of 
medical expense.
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literature of sociology, numbers of studies have documented that “cultural capital” 
is reproduced across generations within a family or a class, through cultural inherit-
ance (see, for example, Bourdieu 1973; DiMaggio 1982).
After the works by Doepke and Zilibotti (2005, 2008), there is a growing atten-
tion to investment in patience capital in the context of endogenous formation of 
“spirit of capitalism” and its effect on economic development (see, for example, 
Kawagishi 2014; Haruyama and Park 2017). To our knowledge, though, the implica-
tion of investment in patience capital to long-run distribution of consumption and 
wealth in relation to the rather classic problem as explained above is not known. 
Does investment in time preference lead to survival and coexistence of heterogenous 
types, or opposite?
Denote the amount of patience capital by 휋 , then the endogenous discount rate is 
given by 훽(휋) , which is decreasing in 휋 , meaning that higher patience leads to less 
discounting of the future. Unlike physical capital, such patience capital is not trans-
ferrable across households after acquired. Evolution of patience capital 휋 at each 
moment is determined by the amount of investment-like consumption. Precisely, it 
is given by:
where z denotes the amount of investment-like capital, g is the production function, 
and 훿 denotes the depreciation rate. Investing z requires material cost, and hence, it 
is in a direct material trade-off with pure consumption. The preference model is seen 
as a multi-period extension of the model by Becker and Mulligan (1997), where they 
assume determination of time preference occurs just once in the initial period. It par-
allels with the discrete-time dynastic model by Doepke and Zilibotti (2005, 2008), 
while there is a conceptual difference (or trade-off, perhaps) that they consider that 
each generation can invest on the next generation’s patience level for the latter’s 
lifetime, but the degree of altruism toward succeeding generation remains constant 
across all generations, and we consider that both evolve endogenously, but they are 
described altogether by one variable 휋.
First, we will consider linear technology, where interest rate r is time-constant, to 
isolate the problem of whether investment in time preference has a stabilizing effect 
for each household or not. In contrary to the previous literature on endogenous time 
preference, we show that the interior steady-state condition:
is unstable in the following sense: per one household, there is a one-dimensional 
curve lying in the space of the two-dimensional space of state variables (휋, k) , where 
k denotes the amount of physical capital, which pass through the interior steady state 
(휋∗, k∗) as the only possible stable path leading to it, such that convergence to the 
steady state occurs only when the vector of initial values (휋(0), k(0)) falls exactly on 
the curve.
Thus, we again see a division of society into two “classes”, where the above-
described curve plays the role of border. Households with initial vectors falling in 
the upper side of the border are to be in the “upper class”, invest more in patience 
?̇? = −𝛿𝜋 + g(z),
훽(휋∗) = r
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capital, which leads themselves to save more, and hence, the consumption level 
grows in the long-run. Households with initial vectors falling in the lower side of 
the border are to be in the “lower class”, opt out from investing in patience capi-
tal, leading to a decay of patience level, which leads themselves to save less, and 
hence, they perish in the long-run. In this sense, the extreme long-run inequality 
as obtained in the basic discounted utility model is shown to be rather robust 
and self-confirming. We also show a possibility that there is an expanding swing 
between the two classes.
We then show that this result extends to economies with technologies with dimin-
ishing returns to capital, as far as the diminishment is sufficiently small. This shows 
that the instability result is not a mere knife-edge case.
2  The household model
Consider an infinite horizon continuous-time setting. There are two consumption 
goods: one is for pure consumption and the other is for “investment-consumption.” 
Denote the amount of pure consumption at time t by c(t), and that of investment-
consumption by z(t). Denote a path of such pair by (c, z) = (c(t), z(t))t≥0 , which is the 
object of preference.
We consider that a household has preference represented in the form:
where 훽 is decreasing in 휋 . The preference is indirectly represented through variable 
휋 , which is interpreted as “patience capital”. Moment by moment, it is accumulated 
through having the investment-consumption z(t), while it depreciates with rate 훿 ≥ 0
.
In a market, a household has to pay for purchasing the investment-consumption 
good. Thus, there is a trade-off between enjoying pure consumption and establishing 
patience through having the investment-consumption good. Also there is a trade-
off between saving and establishing patience, in addition to the standard trade-off 
between pure consumption and saving.
We make the following regularity assumptions on v, 훽 , and g.
Assumption 1 v ∶ ℝ+ → [0, v) is twice-continuously differentiable on ℝ++ and satis-
fies v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0 . Also, it satisfies limc→0 v�(c) = ∞ and limc→∞ v�(c) = 0.
In contrast to the case of standard discounted utility, the assumption that the 
period utility function is positive-valued has a behavioral content, since if it is nega-
tive, the household may prefer to become more impatient. We assume v is bounded 
from above to guarantee that the lifetime utility function is well defined.
U(c, z) =�
∞
0
v(c(t))e− ∫ t0 𝛽(𝜋(𝜏))d𝜏dt
?̇?(t) = − 𝛿𝜋(t) + g(z(t))
𝜋(0) =given,
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Assumption 2 훽 ∶ ℝ++ → (훽,∞) is twice-continuously differentiable on ℝ++ , and 
satisfies 𝛽′ < 0 and 𝛽′′ > 0 . Also, it holds lim휋→0 훽(휋) = ∞ and lim휋→∞ 훽(휋) = 훽.
We assume that 훽 is bounded away from below by 𝛽 > 0 . There are two rea-
sons. One is that it is natural, in the sense that even after indefinite accumulation of 
patience capital, there is a fundamental minimal degree of discounting. Second, the 
minimal degree of discounting guarantees that the lifetime utility is well defined, 
because, otherwise, the household’s lifetime utility may blow up by means of mak-
ing oneself indefinitely more patient.
Finally, we impose the following assumption on production of patience capital, 
which is quite natural.
Assumption 3 g ∶ ℝ+ → ℝ+ is twice-continuously differentiable on ℝ++ , and 
satisfies g′ > 0 , g′′ < 0 , and g(0) = 0 . Also, it satisfies limz→0 g�(z) = ∞ and 
limz→∞ g
�(z) = 0.
3  Dynamic competitive equilibrium and its welfare property
At each time, an output good is produced from an input good and labor. Let F(K, L) 
denote the aggregate production function, where K denotes the amount of capital 
input and L denotes the labor input, and it is assumed to be three-times differentiable 
over ℝ2
++
 , weakly concave, and exhibits constant returns to scale. To suppress nota-
tion, we assume that depreciation of physical capital is already taken into account in 
the specification of F.
Each household has 1 unit of labor time which can be used as production input, 
and for simplicity, we assume that the households have no preference for leisure.
The produced output can be allocated either as the pure consumption good or the 
investment-consumption good or capital holding, as we implicitly assume that there 
is a linear technology which converts between them, and without loss of generality, 
we assume that the rate of conversion is 1.
Let I = {1,… , n} be the set of households. Let ci(t) denote the amount of pure 
consumption, zi(t) denote the amount of investment-consumption, and ki(t) denote 
the amount of capital being held for household i ∈ I and time t, while ki(0) is given. 
Let r(t) denote the return rate of capital and w(t) denote wage at time t. Here, an 
household allocation is denoted by (ci, zi, ki) = (ci(t), zi(t), ki(t))t≥0 and a social one is 
denote by (c, z, k) = (ci, zi, ki)i∈I.
Definition 1 An allocation (c,  z,  k) is a dynamic competitive equilibrium if there 
exists a path (r,w) = (r(t),w(t))t≥0 , such that (ci, zi, ki) maximizes:
under the constraints:
Ui(ci, zi) =�
∞
0
vi(ci(t))e
− ∫ t
0
훽i(휋i(휏))d휏dt
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for every i ∈ I , so that the No-Ponzi condition:
is met, and 
�∑
i∈I ki(t), n
�
 solves the profit-maximization problem:
and the market-clearing condition:
is met for all t.
We assume that there is no borrowing constraint or that it is not binding in finite 
time range, as we are focusing on the question whether the economy can converge to 
an interior long-run steady state.
Under the No-Ponzi condition, we can consolidate the series of sequential budget 
constraints into one, as:
Hence, the current definition of equilibrium falls in the Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie 
framework.
Proposition 1 If (ci, zi, ki)i∈I is a dynamic competitive equilibrium allocation, then 
(ci, zi)i∈I is an Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie equilibrium allocation.
As far as the investment-like consumption is understood as still falling in the cat-
egory of “consumption”, there is nothing wrong with the classic concept of wel-
fare, since any equilibrium consumption path is Pareto-efficient. Moreover, when 
each household is responsible for the initial level of patience capital and the way 
of reproducing it is “a matter of taste”, the equilibrium path is even “fair” in the 
sense of absence of envy among households when they are endowed with equal ini-
tial amounts of physical capital.
Say that a feasible allocation (c, z) = (ci, zi)i∈I is ex-ante Pareto-efficient if there 
is no feasible allocation (̃c, z̃) = (̃ci, z̃i)i∈I , such that Ui (̃ci, z̃i) ≥ Ui(ci, zi) for all i ∈ I 
and Ui(�ci,�zi) > Ui(ci, zi) for at least one i ∈ I.
?̇?i(t) = − 𝛿i𝜋i(t) + gi(zi(t))
k̇i(t) =r(t)ki(t) + w(t) − ci(t) − zi(t)
ci(t), zi(t) ≥0
𝜋i(0), ki(0) =given
lim
t→∞
ki(t)
e∫ t0 r(휏)d휏
≥ 0
max
K,L
F(K, L) − r(t)K − w(t)L
∑
i∈I
ci(t) +
∑
i∈I
zi(t) +
∑
i∈I
k̇i(t) =F
(∑
i∈I
ki(t), n
)
�
∞
0
ci(t) + zi(t)
e∫ t0 r(휏)d휏
dt ≤�
∞
0
w(t)
e∫ t0 r(휏)d휏
dt + r(0)ki(0).
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Say that an allocation (c, z) = (ci, zi)i∈I ex-ante envy-free if Ui(ci, zi) ≥ Ui(cj, zj) 
for all i, j ∈ I . We put the word “ex-ante” to emphasize that it is about ex-ante evalu-
ation of planned life-courses. Note that here, every i is taken to be responsible for its 
preference, including the initial amount of patience capital 휋i(0).
Proposition 2 Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie equilibrium allocation (c, z) is Pareto-effi-
cient. It is also ex-ante envy-free if ki(0) = kj(0) for all i, j ∈ I.
Despite of Pareto efficiency and fairness from the ex-ante viewpoint, we show in 
the next section that the long-run ex-post consequence can be an extreme inequality.
4  Analysis
4.1  Equilibrium dynamics and steady state
Let
which follows the differential equation:
To simply notation, hereafter, we omit t as far as no confusion arises. Then, the 
maximization problem for a generic price-taking household is formulated as:
subject to
Set up the Hamiltonian, assuming an interior path, as:
Then, the individually optimal path is characterized by:
훼i(t) = e
− ∫ t
0
훽i(휋i(휏))d휏
?̇?i(t) = −𝛽i(𝜋i(t))𝛼i(t).
max∫
∞
0
훼ivi(ci)dt
k̇i =rki + w − ci − zi
?̇?i = − 𝛿i𝜋i + gi(zi)
?̇?i = − 𝛽i(𝜋i)𝛼i
ci, zi ≥0
ki(0) =given
𝜋i(0) =given
𝛼i(0) =1.
Hi = 훼ivi(ci) + 휆i
[
rki + w − ci − zi
]
+ 휇i[−훿i휋i + gi(zi)] + 휈i[−훽i(휋i)훼i].
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plus three transversality conditions:
Note that together with the No-Ponzi condition. the first transversality condition 
reduces to:
Also, because of positivity of 휋i , together with the first-order condition, the second 
transversality condition reduces to:
and it is relevant only when 휋i diverges to positive infinity. Note also that the third 
transversality condition is met by any path, under our assumption that utility is 
bounded and the discount rate is bounded away from zero.
We eliminate 휆i , 휇i , and 훼i , while 휈i cannot be, and obtain the dynamics:
On the other hand, from the profit-maximization condition in equilibrium, it holds:
𝛼iv
�
i
(ci) − 𝜆i =0
−𝜆i + 𝜇ig
�
i
(zi) =0
?̇?i = − 𝜆ir
?̇?i =𝛿i𝜇i + 𝛽
�
i
(𝜋i)𝜈i𝛼i
?̇?i = − vi(ci) + 𝛽i(𝜋i)𝜈i
k̇i =rki + w − ci − zi
?̇?i = − 𝛿i𝜋i + gi(zi)
?̇?i = − 𝛽i(𝜋i)𝛼i
lim
t→∞
휆i(t)ki(t) ≤0
lim
t→∞
휇i(t)휋i(t) ≤0
lim
t→∞
휈i(t)훼i(t) ≤0.
lim
t→∞
ki(t)
e∫ t0 r(휏)d휏
= 0.
lim
t→∞
휋i(t)
g�
i
(zi(t))e
∫ t
0
r(휏)d휏
= 0,
ċi =
(𝛽i(𝜋i) − r)v
�
i
(ci)
v��
i
(ci)
żi = −
g�
i
(zi)
g��
i
(zi)
[
r + 𝛿i +
g�
i
(zi)𝛽
�
i
(𝜋i)𝜈i
v�
i
(ci)
]
?̇?i = − vi(ci) + 𝛽i(𝜋i)𝜈i
?̇?i = − 𝛿i𝜋i + gi(zi)
k̇i =rki + w − ci − zi.
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By taking the time derivative of the above, we obtain the dynamics of equilibrium 
interest rate and wage:
Interior steady state ((c∗
i
, z∗
i
, 휈∗
i
,휋∗
i
, k∗
i
)i∈I , r
∗,w∗) , if exists, is determined by:
As far as they all survive, the households end up with the same value of discount 
rate in steady state, which is equal to the given interest rate. Note that general exist-
ence of interior steady state is not obvious, though, because 훽i has the natural lower 
bound 훽
i
 and it might be possible that the r∗ can be above maxi 훽 i only by violating 
the other steady-state conditions. In the next subsections, we present a class of tech-
nologies, such that a unique steady state exists.
Then, the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the interior steady state takes the form of 
(5n + 2) × (5n + 2) matrix:
r =F1
(∑
i
ki, n
)
w =F2
(∑
i
ki, n
)
.
ṙ =F11
(∑
i
ki, n
)[
r
∑
i
ki + nw −
∑
i
ci −
∑
i
zi
]
ẇ =F21
(∑
i
ki, n
)[
r
∑
i
ki + nw −
∑
i
ci −
∑
i
zi
]
.
훽i(휋
∗
i
) =r∗
gi(z
∗
i
) =훿i휋
∗
i
v�
i
(c∗
i
)
vi(c
∗
i
)
= −
g�
i
(z∗
i
)훽�
i
(휋∗
i
)
r∗(r∗ + 훿i)
휈∗
i
=
vi(c
∗
i
)
r∗
k∗
i
=
c∗
i
+ z∗
i
− w∗
r∗
r∗ =F1
(∑
i
k∗
i
, n
)
w∗ =F2
(∑
i
k∗
i
, n
)
.
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where
for each i and
4.2  The case of linear technology
Here, we restrict attention to consumption and investment under linear technol-
ogy, F(K, L) = rK + wL , to isolate the problem of whether investment in patience 
capital has a stabilizing or rather destabilizing effect at the pure household level. 
Assume that r > maxi 𝛽 i , and then, a unique interior steady state exists. Other-
wise, there is no steady state with all households surviving, and some households 
automatically perish in the long run.
When technology is linear, there is no interaction between households, the 
aggregate outcome is simply the sum of individual ones, and it suffices to look 
at each household problem separately. Since F11 = F21 = 0 here and E and Q are 
zero matrices, we only need to look at the stability property of each diagonal 
block Ai separately.
To see if the system described by Ai is stable, note that since 휋i and ki are the 
state variables, the number of stable roots required for stability with a unique 
optimal path is exactly two.
Proposition 3 The number of stable roots for each Ai is one. Let 휃i1 denote the 
only stable root for Ai , and 휃i2, 휃i3, 휃i4, 휃i5 denote the unstable roots, ordered in the 
ascending manner according to their real parts, and then, at least 휃i1, 휃i4, 휃i5 are 
real and it holds:
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O A2 ⋯ O P2
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
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Proof Pick any i. Since it is clear that one eigenvalue of Ai is r, we can restrict atten-
tion to its submatrix:
Then, its characteristic polynomial is:
which is an even function around r  /  2. Note that one can verify: 
−(r + 𝛿i)r
(g�
i
)2
g��
i
𝛽�
i
(
1 −
(v�
i
)2
v��
i
vi
)
< 0.
Since the first line above, a fourth-order function being even around r / 2 equals 
to zero at 휃i = −훿i, 0, r, r + 훿i , and the second line above, a second-order func-
tion being even around r / 2, equals to zero at 휃i = 0, r , their sum equals to zero at 
−훿i − 휔i , 0, r, r + 훿i + 휔i with some 𝜔i > 0.
Since the third line above is negative, pi(휃i) = 0 has at least two real roots −훿i − 휌i 
and r + 훿i + 휌i with 𝜌i > 0 . When pi(r∕2) ≥ 0 , the other two are real and they are 
r∕2 − 휎i and r∕2 + 휎i with 0 ≤ 𝜎i < r∕2 . The case of pi(r∕2) < 0 cannot be ruled 
out, because we can always make v′′ < 0 arbitrarily close to zero without changing 
vi , v′i and the other values and the steady state, so that −(r + 훿i)r
(g�
i
)2
g��
i
훽�
i
(
1 −
(v�
i
)2
v��
i
vi
)
 is a 
large negative number. Then, the other two roots are complex and they are 
r∕2 − 휎i
√
−1 and r∕2 + 휎i
√
−1 with 휎i being some real number.   ◻
Since the number of stable roots for each household’s linearized system is one, 
the interior steady state is unstable, while there is a stable manifold with dimension 
one, a curve.
To get an idea about the dynamics, we can verify that the eigenvector for 휃i4 = r 
is (0, 0, 0, 0, 1)T , and the eigenvector for each 휃ik , k = 1, 2, 3, 5 , is:
which implies that the local dynamics is given by:
𝜃i1 < −𝛿i < 0 < Re𝜃i2 ≤ Re𝜃i3 < 𝜃i4 = r < r + 𝛿i < 𝜃i5.
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where the constants {sik}k=1,2,3,4,5 are determined according to the initial values. 
Note that the eigenvectors projected on the space of state variables (휋i, ki) are down-
ward for 휃i1 and 휃i5 , upward for 휃i2 and 휃i3 when they are real, and vertical for 휃i4 = r . 
Hence, the curve of stable manifold projected on the space of state variables is 
downward-sloping.
Since 휃i4 = r and 𝜃i5 > r + 𝛿i are inconsistent with the conjunction of No-Ponzi 
condition and transversality condition, however, the associated upper left/lower right 
directions will not play a role in the global dynamics.
Thus, when 휃i2 and 휃i3 are real, the flows projected on the space of state vari-
ables look like Fig. 1. Here, the space is partitioned by the projected curve, and if 
the initial (휋i(0), ki(0)) falls in one side, the household will invest more on patience 
capital, which leads to higher saving in the future and more accumulation of capital, 
resulting in more consumption in further future, and so on, and if it falls in the other 
side, the household will opt out from investing on patience capital, which leads to 
lower saving in the future and eating up the capital, resulting in less consumption in 
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
ci − c
∗
i
zi − z
∗
i
휈i − 휈
∗
i
휋i − 휋
∗
i
ki − k
∗
i
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= si4e
rt
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
0
1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
�
k=1,2,3,5
sike
휃ik t
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
휃k
훽�
i
v�
i
v��
i
휃k+훿
g�
i
1
r−휃k
�
1
휃k
훽�
i
(v�
i
)2
v��
i
−
훽�
i
vi
r
�
1
1
r−휃k
�
1
휃k
훽�
i
v�
i
v��
i
+
휃k+훿i
g�
i
�
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
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Fig. 1  Flows projected on the space of state variables: the case of 휃
i2, 휃i3 being real
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further future, and so on, while the speed of divergence to infinity/convergence to 
zero must be sufficiently modest to meet the transversality conditions. Thus, we see 
a division of society into two “classes”, even among ex-ante identical households, 
depending on their initial values of physical capital and patience capital.
In the literature of (analytical) Marxian economics, they make a seemingly ad 
hoc assumption that capitalists are interested only in accumulation and workers are 
totally myopic, make no saving, and always live at the subsistence level (see, for 
example, Okisio 1963; Morishima 1977; Roemer 1988). The instability result may 
serve as an explanation that such extreme division can be rather self-confirming.
Note that this saddle-point instability is about steady state projected onto the 
two-dimensional space of state variables. The familiar saddle-point nature which we 
observe for example in the standard optimal growth model is about steady state in 
the space of one state variable (such as physical capital) and one jump variable (such 
as consumption). There, the household or planner can choose the initial value of the 
jump variable, and the fact that a steady state being a saddle point means that it is 
stable with regard to a unique optimal path. Here, neither a household or a planner 
can choose the initial pair of physical capital and patience capital, and therefore, a 
steady state being a saddle-point means that it is unstable in the above-stated sense.
Still we cannot rule out the case that 휃i2 and 휃i3 are complex. Then, the unstable 
flows form expanding cycles spinning around the curve of stable manifold, which look 
like Fig. 2 when projected on the space of state variables. This is a puzzling case, since 
when such an unstably cyclical orbit passes above and below the curve of stable mani-
fold (i.e., when their projections cross on the space of state variables), the household 
ki
pii
Fig. 2  Flows projected on the space of state variables: the case of 휃
i2, 휃i3 being complex
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can switch between the stable path and the unstable orbit, by restarting the life with 
the current state variable (휋i, ki) . This can be viewed as a kind of indeterminacy, as the 
initial value (휋i(0), ki(0)) may not determine an unique optimal path even for a single 
household.
4.3  Diminishing returns to capital and capital/labor complementarity
Just to explain that the instability result as above is not a mere knife-edge case due 
to linear technology, we show that the above argument extends to economies with 
diminishing returns to capital and capital/labor complementarity, while the degrees 
of diminishment and complementarity are sufficiently small.
We can take for example the class of CES production functions with the form 
F(K, L) = A[aK휌 + (1 − a)L휌]
1
휌 − 휂K , where 휂 denotes the rate of depreciation, such 
that the corresponding production set coincides with that of the linear production 
function rK + wL along the ray connecting the origin and 
�∑
i k
∗
i
, n
�
 . By varying 
A, a, 휌, 휂 , we can make F11 and F21 arbitrarily close to zero at 
�∑
i k
∗
i
, n
�
.
Then, the characteristic polynomial for the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the 
steady state is given by:
where I denotes the 5 × 5 identity matrix.
Consider doing cofactor expansion of the above determinant formula first along 
the 5n + 2 th row and then along the 5n + 1 th row. Because all the entries of the sec-
ond row of E are constant multiples of F21 and all the entries of the first row of E are 
constant multiples of F11 , all the terms in the expanded determinant formula other 
than the one obtained by going along the diagonal are constant multiples of either of 
F11 , F21 , or F11F21 . Thus, the characteristic equation takes the form:
where G1(휃),G2(휃), and G12(휃) are 5nth order polynomials.
Now, consider that F11 and F21 are arbitrarily close to zero. Then, the collection of 
roots in the characteristic equation is arbitrarily close to the one for:
Because the term ∏i ��휃I − Ai�� is independent of F11 and F21 , the signs of 5n roots 
being close to the 5n ones for ∏i ��휃I − Ai�� = 0 , which are all non-zero, do not 
change when F11 and F21 are sufficiently small. Out of those 5n roots, from the 
�������������
휃I − A1 O ⋯ O − P1
O 휃I − A2 ⋯ O − P2
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
O O ⋯ 휃I − An − Pn
−E − E ⋯ − E
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∑
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∗
i
− F11n
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∑
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∗
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,
(
휃 − F11
∑
i
k∗
i
)(
휃 − F21n
)∏
i
||휃I − Ai|| + F11G1(휃) + F21G2(휃) + F11F21G12(휃) = 0,
휃2
∏
i
||휃I − Ai|| = 0.
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previous result we see that the number of stable roots is n. The signs of the remain-
ing two are ambiguous as they may switch across zero under small perturbation.
Summing up, we obtain the following claim.
Proposition 4 Pick any r > maxi 𝛽 i and w for which an interior steady state 
(c∗
i
, z∗
i
, 휈∗
i
,휋∗
i
, k∗
i
)i∈I exists in the corresponding linear technology economy. Then, 
there is a range of technology F with constant returns to scale and F11
�∑
i k
∗
i
, n
�
< 0 
and F21
�∑
i k
∗
i
, n
�
> 0 , which results in the same interior steady state with 
F1
�∑
i k
∗
i
, n
�
= r and F2
�∑
i k
∗
i
, n
�
= w , such that the number of stable roots in the 
linearized system is either n or n + 1 or n + 2 , while stability requires; it is 2n.
Thus, while there is a possibility of stability and even indeterminacy when n = 1 
or n = 2 , the similar kind of instability shows up again when n ≥ 3 , and its nature 
gets closer to the one under linear technology as n tends to be large.
5  Conclusion
We conclude by listing the remaining problems and suggesting future directions for 
the research.
A complete and global characterization of equilibrium path is obviously desired, 
especially for the case of stronger diminishing returns to capital and capital/labor 
complementarity, while we believe that we have spelled out the critical nature of it. 
This will require a more involved technical treatment of the system of differential 
equations obtained here.
There will be two effects of lowering interest rate over time adjusting to diminish-
ing returns to capital, while the total effect is ambiguous. One is that as r tends to 
go below 훽 , the bar for remaining in the “upper class” tends to be higher. This will 
discourage households from investing in patience capital and they will opt out. The 
other is that lowering interest rate makes patience capital relatively cheaper com-
pared to physical capital, and this encourages investment in the former.
A numerical approach may help to get a picture. For example, in the case or time-
constant interest rate, we can obtain the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation:
and there are substantial numbers of studies which allow us to solve such class of 
functional equation.
Also, its discrete-time counterpart is solvable by the recursive method (this con-
firms that the household model is dynamically consistent). The Bellman equation
where
훽(휋)V(휋, k) = max
c,z
{
v(c) + V1(휋, k)
[
−훿휋 + g(z)
]
+ V2(휋, k)[rk + w − c − z]
}
,
V(휋, k) = max
{
v(c) +
1
1 + 훽(휋)
V(휋�, k�)
}
,
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is solvable by the simple contraction-mapping method.
Also, one can think of a more general form of production of patience capital, like
while it will require handling complementarity between patience capital and 
investment.
From the standpoint of classic concept of welfare, there is nothing wrong with 
having severe ex-post inequalities in the long run, as time preference and the way of 
reproducing it are understood as “a matter of taste”. This is even “fair” from the ex-
ante viewpoint. Yet, we will need to ask whether we should accept resulting ex-post 
inequalities and how we should reconcile between ex-ante equity and ex-post equity.
There is a difficulty, however, that even when we accept ex-post redistribution 
of physical capital, the same kind of inequality may emerge again, because it is 
impossible to redistribute patience capital. Then, the question becomes whether we 
should continuously redistribute physical capital to compensate for the infeasibility 
of redistribution of patience capital (or cultural capital/human capital in general), 
but this is even more ethically demanding.
One may think of a governmental intervention to promote investment in patience 
capital, but this leads to inefficiency according to the classic concept of welfare, 
since there is no externality between households here.
Finally, note that we considered an entirely frictionless economy with perfect 
foresights. This leaves a question whether any market friction or bounded foresight/
concistency strengthens instability or rather stabilizes long-run distribution.4
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?̇? = h(z, 𝜋),
4 In the standard case of fixed discount rates, Sorger (2008) argues that the most patient household can-
not be price-taking as it collects large portion of wealth in the society, which, in turn, results in allowing 
all households to have positive consumption/wealth in the long run.
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